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Rogers v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 88 (Dec. 29, 2011)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – HABEAS CORPUS
Summary
An appeal from a district court denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, with
consideration of the scope and applicability of Graham v. Florida to a term-of-years sentence.2
Disposition/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the petition without appointing counsel for the appellant. Because failure to
appoint post-conviction counsel prevented a meaningful litigation of the petition, the Court
expressed no opinion on the applicability of Graham to a term-of-years sentence.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1988 at 17 years old, Michael Rogers (“Rogers”) committed brutal sexual offenses
against two women. He pled guilty and was convicted of three counts of sexual assault (“counts
three, four, six”), and three counts of sexual assault with a deadly weapon causing substantial
bodily harm (“counts eleven, twelve, fourteen”). Rogers was sentenced to three consecutive
terms of life with the possibility of parole for counts three, four and six, and a total of six
consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for counts eleven, twelve and fourteen,
to be served consecutively to the terms imposed in three, four, and six.
In September 2010, Rogers filed a proper person post-conviction petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that the sentences of life without the possibility of parole for counts
eleven, twelve, and fourteen were cruel and unusual punishment. He also claimed the manner of
imposing consecutive sentences was cruel and unusual punishment. Both claims were based on
the recent decision in Graham, where the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution
prohibits a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender who did not commit a
homicide.3 Finally, Rogers moved for appointment of counsel on the grounds that he was
indigent.
The district court denied Rogers request to be provided with counsel. However, though
his petition was untimely, the district court decided that Graham applied retroactively pursuant
to the retroactivity analysis in Colwell v State,4 and that Graham provided good cause in this
case. Therefore, the district court commuted Rogers’ sentences for counts eleven, twelve, and
fourteen to life sentences with the possibility of parole after ten years, but did not specifically
address whether Rogers’ consecutive sentences also constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
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Discussion
The per curiam opinion of the Court noted that Rogers was required to demonstrate good
cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of untimely petition.5 The Court
recognized that good cause could be established where the legal basis for a claim was not
available for a prior, timely petition. Additionally, NRS 34.750(1) provided for discretionary
appointment of post-conviction counsel based on factors such as petitioner’s indigency, the
severity of the consequences to the petitioner, and the difficulty of the issues presented. Here,
petitioner was indigent, his six consecutive terms of life imprisonment were severe, and his
petition raised difficult issues relating to the scope and applicability of Graham. Thus, the Court
concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition without appointing
counsel for Roger.
The Court next addressed the fact that the district court failed to address whether Roger’s
multiple consecutive sentences amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under Graham. In so
doing, the district court left unresolved whether Graham applied only to a sentence of life
without parole or whether it applied also to a lengthy sentence structure imposing a total
sentence functionally equivalent to life without parole. Other courts addressing juveniles and
non-homicide offenses have split on Graham’s applicability to a term of years sentence that
would be functionally equivalent to a life-without-parole sentence.6
The Court affirmed for lack of good cause the district court’s denial of Rogers’ claims
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have Rogers evaluated prior to sentencing, or to
present mitigating evidence at sentencing. However, the Court reversed and remanded the district
court’s partial denial of Roger’s petition to appoint counsel to assist him with his post-conviction
proceedings.
Conclusion
Failure to appoint post-conviction counsel prevented a meaningful litigation of Rogers’
petition and failed to resolve whether multiple consecutive sentences amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment under Graham.
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